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Stochastic differential switching game in infinite
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Abstract
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential switching game in infinite horizon.
We prove the existence of the value of the game and characterize it as the unique
viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities with bi-
lateral obstacles. We also obtain a verification theorem which provides an optimal
strategy of the game. Finally, some numerical examples with two regimes are given.
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1 Introduction
Differential game theory involves multiple persons (also called players or individuals)
decision making in the context of dynamic system. The study of the two-person zero-
sum differential games could be traced back to the pioneering work by Isaacs [21], which
inspired further research in this area.
In 1989, Fleming and Souganidis [15], for the first time, studied two-person zerosum
stochastic differential games. They adopted the definitions of upper and lower value func-
tions introduced by Elliott and Kalton [13] and proved that the two value functions satisfy
the dynamic programming principle and they are the unique viscosity solutions to the
associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs partial differential equations (HJBI PDEs).
Their work generalized that of Evans and Souganidis [14] from the deterministic frame-
work to the stochastic one and is now regarded as one of the outstanding results in the
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field of stochastic differential games. In 1995, Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [17] introduced
the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) theory into the study of stochas-
tic differential games, and there exist also many other works using this BSDEs approach,
such as Hamade`ne, Lepeltier, and Peng [18]. Subsequently, Buckdahn and Li [2] extended
the findings presented in [17, 18], and generalized the framework introduced in [15].
In this paper we consider the state process of the stochastic differential game, defined
as the solution of the following stochastic equation:
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xr, at, bt)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xr, at, bt)dWr s ≥ t,
with Xt− = x. Here W is a d-dimensional Wiener process, while
at =
∑
m≥1
ξm1 (τm≤t<τm+1](t) and bt =
∑
n≥1
ηn1 (ρn≤t<ρn+1](t).
with the cost functional
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsf(Xs, at, bt)ds−
∑
m≥1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm) +
∑
n≥1
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn)
]
. (1.1)
The first player chooses the control a from a given finite set I to maximize the payoff
(1.1), and each actions is related with one cost C, while the second player chooses the
control b from I to minimize the payoff (1.1), and each of his actions is associated with
the other cost χ. The zero-sum stochastic differential games problems we will investigate
is to show the upper and lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value. The
Isaacs’ system of quasi-variational inequalities for this switching game is the following:
for any i, j ∈ I, and x ∈ Rm,
max
{
min
[
rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f(x, i, j);
V ij(x)−M ij [V ](x)
]
;V ij(x)−N ij [V ](x)
}
= 0,
(1.2)
and
min
{
max
[
rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f(x, i, j);
V ij(x)−N ij [V ](x)
]
;V ij(x)−M ij [V ](x)
}
= 0.
(1.3)
where,
M ij [V ](x) = max
k 6=i
{V kj(x)− C(i, k)}, N ij [V ](x) = min
l 6=j
{V il(x) + χ(j, l)}.
In the finite horizon framework, the switching game have been studied by several
authors. The most recent work discussing this topic includes the papers by Djehiche et
al. (2017) ([8]), Tang and Hou (2007) ([32]).
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The objective of this work is to establish existence and uniqueness of a continuous vis-
cosity solution of (1.2) and (1.3). The second contribution of our paper is the Verification
Theorem which provides an optimal strategy of the game, To the best of our knowledge,
this issue have not been addressed in the literature yet.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we list all the notations, state the
full set of assumptions, and define viscosity sub- and supersolutions along with equivalent
characterizations. In Section 3, we shall introduce the stochastic differential game problem
and give some preliminary results of the lower and the upper value functions of stochastic
differential game. In Section 4, by the dynamic programming principle we prove that
the lower and upper value functions of the game satisfy the Isaacs’ system of quasi-
variational inequalities in the viscosity solution sense. In Section 5, we show that the
solution of Isaacs’ system of quasi-variational inequalities is unique. Further, the upper
and the lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value. In Section 6, we
present a verification theorem which gives an optimal strategy of the switching game,
while finally Section 7 will present some numerical examples.
2 Assumptions and problem formulation
Throughout this paper m and d are two integers. Let I = {1, ..., q} the finite set of
regimes, and assume the following assumptions:
[H1] b : Rm × I × I → Rm and σ : Rm × I × I → Rm×d be two continuous functions for
which there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any x, x′ ∈ Rm and i, j ∈ I
|σ(x, i, j)− σ(x′, i, j)|+ |b(x, i, j)− b(x′, i, j)| ≤ C|x− x′|. (2.1)
Thus they are also of linear growth. i.e., there exists a constant C such that for any
x ∈ Rm and i, j ∈ I
|σ(x, i, j)|+ |b(x, i, j)| ≤ C(1 + |x|). (2.2)
[H2] f : Rm × I × I → R is a continuous function for which there exists a constant C
such that for each i, j ∈ I, x, x′ ∈ Rm:
|f(x, i, j)| ≤ C(1 + |x|) and (2.3)
|f(x, i, j)− f(x′, i, j)| ≤ C|x− x′|. (2.4)
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[H3] For any i, j ∈ I The switching costs C(i, j) and χ(i, j) are constants, and we assume
the triangular condition :
C(i, k) < C(i, j) + C(j, k), j 6= i, k. (2.5)
χ(i, k) < χ(i, j) + χ(j, k), j 6= i, k, (2.6)
which means that it is less expensive to switch directly in one step from regime i to k
than in two steps via an intermediate regime j. Notice that a switching costs C(i, j) and
χ(i, j) may be negative, and conditions (2.5) and (2.6) for i = k prevents an arbitrage by
simply switching back and forth, i.e.
0 < C(i, j) + C(j, i). (2.7)
0 < χ(i, j) + χ(j, i). (2.8)
We set bij(.) = b(., i, j), σij(.) = σ(., i, j) and f ij(.) = f(., i, j).
We now consider the following Isaacs’ system of quasi-variational inequalities: for any
i, j ∈ I, and x ∈ Rm,
max
{
min
[
rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f ij(x);
V ij(x)−M ij [V ](x)
]
;V ij(x)−N ij [V ](x)
}
= 0,
(2.9)
and
min
{
max
[
rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f ij(x);
V ij(x)−N ij [V ](x)
]
;V ij(x)−M ij [V ](x)
}
= 0.
(2.10)
Where
(i) r is a positive discount factor and A is the following infinitesimal generator:
AV ij = 〈bij ,∇xV
ij〉+
1
2
tr[σij(σij)∗∇2xV
ij].
(ii) For any x ∈ Rm and i, j ∈ I,
M ij [V ](x) = max
k 6=i
{V kj(x)− C(i, k)}, N ij [V ](x) = min
l 6=j
{V il(x) + χ(j, l)}.
We now define the notions of viscosity solution of the system (2.9). We can similarly
define the notions for (2.10).
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Definition 1 Let ~V = (V kl(x))(k,l)∈I×I : IR
m → IR such that for any (i, j) ∈ I × I, V ij
is continuous, is called:
(i) A viscosity supersolution to (2.9) if for any i, j ∈ I, for any x0 ∈ IR
m and any function
φij ∈ C2(IRm) such that φij(x0) = V
ij(x0) and x0 is a local maximum of φ
ij − V ij, we
have:
max
{
min
[
rφij(x0)− Lφ
ij(x0)− f
ij(x0),
V ij(x0)−M
ij [V ](x0)
]
, V ij(x0)−N
ij [V ](x0)
}
≥ 0.
(2.11)
(ii) A viscosity subsolution to (2.9) if for any i, j ∈ I, for any x0 ∈ IR
m and any function
φij ∈ C2(IRm) such that φij(x0) = V
ij(x0) and x0 is a local minimum of φ
ij − V ij, we
have:
max
{
min
[
rφij(x0)− Lφ
ij(x0)− f
ij(x0),
V ij(x0)−M
ij [V ](x0)
]
, V ij(x0)−N
ij [V ](x0)
}
≤ 0.
(2.12)
(iii) A viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity supersolution and subsolution. ✷
There is an equivalent formulation of this definition (see e.g.[5]) which we give since it
will be useful later. So firstly we define the notions of superjet and subjet of a continuous
function V .
Definition 2 Let V ∈ C(IRm), x an element of IRm and finally Sm the set of m × m
symmetric matrices. We denote by J2,+V (x) (resp. J2,−V (x)), the superjets (resp. the
subjets) of V at x, the set of pairs (q,X) ∈ IRm × Sm such that:
V (y) ≤ V (x) + 〈q, y − x〉 + 1
2
〈X(y − x), y − x〉+ o(|y − x|2)
(resp. V (y) ≥ V (x) + 〈q, y − x〉 + 1
2
〈X(y − x), y − x〉 + o(|y − x|2)).✷
Note that if φ− V has a local maximum (resp. minimum) at x, then we obviously have:
(Dxφ(x), D
2
xxφ(x)) ∈ J
2,−V (x) (resp. J2,+V (x)).✷
We now give an equivalent definition of a viscosity solution of of the system (2.9).
Definition 3 Let ~V = (V kl(x))(k,l)∈I×I : IR
m → IR such that for any (i, j) ∈ I × I; V ij
continuous , is called a viscosity supersolution (resp. a viscosity subsolution) to (2.9) if
for any i, j ∈ I, for any x ∈ IRm and any (q,X) ∈ J2,−V ij(x) (resp. J2,+V ij(x)),
max
{
min
[
rV ij − 1
2
Tr[(σij)∗Xσij ]− 〈bij, q〉 − f ij(x);
V ij(x)−M ij [V ](x)
]
;V ij(x)−N ij [V ](x)
}
≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0).
(2.13)
It is called a viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution. ✷
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As pointed out previously we will show that system (2.9) and (2.9) has a unique
solution in viscosity sense. This systems are the deterministic version of the zero-sum
switching game which we will describe briefly in the next section.
3 The zero-sum switching game
3.1 Setting of the problem
Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a d-dimensional standard Wiener
process W = (Wt) defined on it. Let F = (Ft)t≥0 be the natural filtration generated by
the Wiener process, completed with the P-null sets of F . We begin by description of the
zero-sum switching game.
Definition 4 Assume we have two players I and II who intervene on a system (e.g. the
production of energy from several sources such as oil, cole, hydro-electric, etc.) with the
help of switching strategies. An admissible switching process for I (resp. II) is a sequence
δ := (τm, ξm)m≥0 (resp. ν := (ρn, ηn)n≥0) where:
(i) (τm)m (resp. (ρn)n), the action times, is a sequence of F-stopping times such that
τm < τm+1 (resp. ρn < ρn+1) and τn →∞ (resp. ρn →∞).
(ii) (ξm)m (resp. (ηn)n), the actions, is a sequence of I-valued random variables, where
each ξm (resp. ηn) is Fτm-measurable (resp. Fρn-measurable).
Next let (i, j) ∈ I × I be fixed. We say that the admissible switching strategy
δ := (τm, ξm)m≥0 of I (resp. ν := (ρn, ηn)n≥0) (resp. II) belongs to A
i (resp. Bj) if
τ0 = 0, ξ0 = i (resp. ρ0 = 0, η0 = j).
Given an admissible strategy δ (resp. ν) of I (resp. II), one associates a stochastic
process (at)t≥0 (resp. (bt)t≥0) which indicates along with time the current mode of I (resp.
II) and which is defined by: ∀t ≥ 0
at = ξ01 {τ0}(t)+
∑
m≥1
ξm−11 (τm−1,τm](t) (resp. bt = η01 {ρ0}(t)+
∑
n≥1
ηn−11 (ρn−1,ρn](t)). (3.1)
The evolution of the state of the game is described by the following stochastic equation:
{
dXt = b
atbt(Xt)dt+ σ
atbt(Xt)dWt, t ≥ 0,
X0 = x
(3.2)
We assume that for any x ∈ Rm and i, j ∈ I, there exists a unique strong solution to
(3.2). Let now δ := (τm, ξm)m≥0 (resp. ν := (ρn, ηn)n≥0) be an admissible strategy for I
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(resp. II) which belongs to Ai (resp. Bj). The interventions of the players are not free
and generate a payoff which is a reward (resp. cost) for I (resp. II) and whose expression
is given by
J(x, δ, ν) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds−
∑
m≥1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm) +
∑
n≥1
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn)
]
.
(3.3)
Following Buckdahn and Li [2], we define nonanticipative strategy as follows.
Definition 5 A nonanticipative strategy for player I is a mapping
α : ∪j∈IB
j → Ai
such that for any stopping time τ and any b, b′ ∈ Bj, with b ≡ b′ on J0, τK, it holds that
α(b) ≡ α(b′) on J0, τK. (with the notation J0, τK = {(s, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, 0 ≤ s ≤ τ(ω)}).
A nonanticipative strategy for player II
β : ∪i∈IA
i → Bj
is defined similarly. The set of all nonanticipative strategies α (resp. β) for player I (resp.
II) is denoted by Γi (resp, ∆j).
We define the upper (resp. lower) value of the game by
V
ij
(x) = inf
β∈∆j
sup
δ∈Ai
J(x, δ, β(δ)) (3.4)
(
resp.
V ij(x) = sup
α∈Γi
inf
ν∈Bj
J(x, α(ν), ν)
)
. (3.5)
The game has a value if V ij = V
ij
.
3.2 Preliminary results
In this section we present some properties of the lower and upper value functions of
our switching game.
Lemma 1 (see e.g. [29]) The process Xx satisfies the following estimate: There exists a
constant ρ such that
E[|Xxt |] ≤ e
ρt(1 + |x|) ∀t ≥ 0. (3.6)
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Proposition 1 Under the standing assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), there exists some
positive constant ρ such that for r ≥ ρ, the lower and upper value function are satisfy a
linear growth condition: for all i, j ∈ I and x ∈ IRm there exists a constant C such that
|V
ij
(x)|, |V ij(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|). (3.7)
Proof : We make the proof only for the lower value function V
ij
, the other case being
analogous. for every δ ∈ Ai we consider the particular strategy: β˜(δ) = (ρ˜n, η˜n) given by
ρ˜n =∞, η˜n = j for all n ≥ 1 we have
V
ij
(x) ≤ sup
δ∈Ai
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds−
∑
m≥1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)
]
. (3.8)
Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a strategy δ ∈ Ai such that
V
ij
(x) ≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds−
∑
m≥1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)
]
+ ǫ. (3.9)
The switching cost is dominated by
−
N∑
m=1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm) ≤ max
k∈I
(−C(i, k)) (3.10)
for any N ≥ 1, which can be proved by induction as in [26]. Indeed, (3.10) obviously
holds for N= 1. Suppose now that it is also verified for some N − 1 and let us show that
it is valid for N . When C(ξN−1, ξN) ≥ 0 holds as r ≥ 0. When C(ξN−1, ξN) < 0, we have
−
∑N
m=1 e
−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)
= −
∑N−2
m=1 e
−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)− (e
−rτN−1C(ξN−2, ξN−1) + e
−rτNC(ξN−1, ξN))
≤ −
∑N−2
m=1 e
−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)− e
−rτN−1(C(ξN−2, ξN−1) + C(ξN−1, ξN))
≤ −
∑N−2
m=1 e
−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)− e
−rτN−1C(ξN−2, ξN) ≤ maxk∈I(−C(i, k)).
Combining (3.9) and (3.10) gives us
V
ij
(x) ≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds+max
k∈I
(−C(i, k))
]
+ ǫ. (3.11)
Now, from estimate (3.6) and the polynomial growth condition of f ij in (H2), there exists
C and ρ such that
V
ij
(x) ≤
C
r
+ C(1 + |x|)
∫ ∞
0
e(ρ−r)sds+max
k∈I
(−C(i, k)). (3.12)
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Therefore if r > ρ we have
V
ij
(x) ≤ C(1 + |x|).
On the other hand, by considering the particular strategy δ˜ = (τ˜m, ξ˜m) given by
τ˜m =∞, ξ˜m = i for all m ≥ 1, and for ǫ > 0 there exists a strategy ν ∈ B
j such that
V
ij
(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds+
∑
n≥1
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηm)
]
. (3.13)
For all N ≥ 1, we have
N∑
n=1
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn) ≥ min
l∈I
(χ(j, l)).
Then, we get
V
ij
(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds+min
l∈I
(χ(j, l))
]
. (3.14)
As a consequence, there exists C and ρ such that
V
ij
(x) ≥ −
C
r
− C(1 + |x|)
∫ ∞
0
e(ρ−r)sds+min
l∈I
(χ(j, l)). (3.15)
Therefore if r > ρ, we have
V
ij
(x) ≥ −C(1 + |x|).
from which we deduce the thesis. ✷
Lemma 2 There exists some positive constant ρ such that for r > ρ, x, x′ ∈ Rm, δ ∈ Ai
and ν ∈ Bj we have
|J(x, δ, ν)− J(x′, δ, ν)|+ |V
ij
(x)− V
ij
(x′)|+ |V ij(x)− V ij(x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|,
for some positive constant C.
Proof. It is enough to show that the conclusion holds for the gain functional J .
For every x, x′ ∈ Rm, u ∈ Ai, ν ∈ Bj , we have
|J(x, δ, ν)−J(x′, δ, ν)| ≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rs|fasbs(Xxs )−f
asbs(Xx
′
s )|ds
]
.
By a standard estimate for the SDE applying Ito’s formula to |Xx − Xx
′
|2 and using
Gronwall’s lemma, we then obtain from the Lipschitz condition on bij , σij, the following
inequality
E[|Xxt −X
x′
t | ] ≤ e
ρt|x− x′| ∀x, x′ ∈ Rm, t ≥ 0.
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From the Lipschitz condition on f ij, we deduce
|J(x, δ, ν)− J(x′, δ, ν)| ≤ CE
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rs|Xxs −X
x′
s |ds
]
≤ CE
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rseρs|x− x′|ds
]
≤ C|x− x′|,
for r > ρ. This ends the proof. ✷
In the sequel, we shall assume that r is large enough, which ensures that the value
functions are Lipschitz continuous. We now present the dynamic programming principle
of the zero-sum switching game.
Theorem 1 For any x ∈ Rm and i, j ∈ I, we have
V
ij
(x) = inf
β∈∆j
sup
δ∈Ai
E
[ ∫ θ
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds−
∑
τm≤θ
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)
+
∑
ρn≤θ
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn) + e
−rθV
aθbθ
(Xxθ )
]
.
(3.16)
V ij(x) = sup
α∈Γi
inf
ν∈Bj
E
[ ∫ θ
0
e−rsfasbs(Xxs )ds−
∑
τm≤θ
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)
+
∑
ρn≤θ
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn) + e
−rθV aθbθ(Xxθ )
]
,
(3.17)
where θ is any stopping time.
This principle was formally stated in [2] and proved rigorously for the finite horizon case
in [33]. The arguments for the infinite horizon case may be adapted in a straightforward
way.
4 Isaacs’ system of quasi-variational inequalities
In the present section we prove that the two value functions are viscosity solutions to
(2.9) and (2.10). But we make the proof only for (2.10), the other case is analogous. We
begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For any i, j ∈ I, the lower and upper value functions satisfy the following
properties: for all x ∈ Rm,
V ij(x) ≤ N ij [V ](x) (4.1)
M ij [V ](x) ≤ V ij(x) (4.2)
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Proof : We make the proof only for the lower value function V
ij
, the other case being
analogous. For every j, j˜ ∈ I, j 6= j˜ and ν˜ ∈ Bj˜ we define ν ∈ Bj by
ρ˜l−1 = ρl, ρ0 = 0, η˜l−1 = ηl, η0 = j.
Note that ρ0 = ρ1 = 0. Let ν˜ := {ρ˜l, η˜l} and ν := {ρl, ηl}, then
V
ij
(x) ≤ sup
δ∈Ai
J(x, δ, ν) = sup
δ∈Ai
[
J(x, δ, ν˜) + χ(j, j˜)
]
,
from which we deduce that the following inequality holds:
V
ij
(x) ≤ V
ij˜
(x) + χ(j, j˜).
Therefore
V
ij
(x) ≤ inf
j˜ 6=j
{V
ij˜
(x) + χ(j, j˜)}.
In a similar way we can prove (4.2), hence deducing the thesis. ✷
Theorem 2 For any i, j ∈ I, the lower value function V
ij
and the upper value function
V ij are viscosity solutions of (2.9).
Proof.We state the proof only for lower value function, the other case is analogous. First,
we prove the supersolution property. Fix i, j ∈ I and let x¯ ∈ IRm, ϕij ∈ C2(IRm) such
that x¯ is a minimum of V
ij
− ϕij with V
ij
(x¯) = ϕij(x¯). We have, by Lemma 3
V
ij
(x¯)−N ij [V ](x¯) ≤ 0.
If
V
ij
(x¯)−N ij [V ](x¯) = 0,
then we are done. Now suppose
V
ij
(x¯)−N ij [V ](x¯) < −2ǫ < 0,
we prove by contradiction that
rϕij(x¯)−Aϕij(x¯)− f ij(x¯) ≥ 0.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., rϕij(x¯) − Aϕij(x¯)− f ij(x¯) < 0. Then without loss of generality
we can assume that rϕij(x¯)−Aϕij(x¯)− f ij(x¯) < 0 and V
ij
(x)−N ij [V ](x) < −ǫ < 0 on
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B(x¯, δ).
Define the stopping time τ by
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ B(x¯, δ)}.
Let ǫ1 > 0, using the dynamic programming principle, we deduce the existence of a
strategy β ∈ ∆j such that
V
ij
(x¯) ≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
0
e−rsf ij(X x¯s )ds+ 1 [ρ1≤τ ]e
−rρ1
(
χ(j, η1) + V
iη1
(X x¯ρ1)
)]
+E
[
1 [ρ1>τ ]e
−rτV
ij
(X x¯τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
0
e−rsf ij(X x¯s )ds+ 1 [ρ1≤τ ]e
−rρ1N ij [V ](X x¯ρ1)
]
+ E
[
1 [ρ1>τ ]e
−rτV
ij
(X x¯τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
0
e−rsf ij(X x¯s )ds+ e
−r(ρ1∧τ)V
ij
(X x¯ρ1∧τ )
]
− ǫ1.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we only need to consider β ∈ ∆j such that ρ1 > τ .
Then
ϕij(x¯) = V
ij
(x¯) ≥ E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rsf ij(X x¯s )ds+ e
−rτV
ij
(X x¯τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rsf ij(X x¯s )ds+ e
−rτϕij(X x¯τ )
]
− ǫ1.
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−rtϕij(X x¯t ) and plugging into the last inequality, we obtain
0 ≤ E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rs(rϕij −Aϕij − f ij)(X x¯s )ds
]
− ǫ1,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have 0 ≤ (rϕij −Aϕij − f ij)(x¯).
Thanks to Lemma 3, it is enough to show that given x¯ ∈ Rm such that
M ij [V ](x¯) ≤ V
ij
(x¯).
Then
max
{
min
[
rϕij(x¯)−Aϕij(x¯)− f ij(x¯);
V
ij
(x¯)−M ij [V ](x¯)
]
;V
ij
(x¯)−N ij [V ](x¯)
}
≥ 0.
(4.3)
Which is the supersolution property. The subsolution property is proved analogously.
✷
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5 Uniqueness of the solution of Isaacs’ system of quasi-
variational inequalities
We prove that the (2.9) admits a unique viscosity solution. We need to make an
additional assumption on the switching costs.
[H5] (The no free loop property)
For any sequence of pairs {ip, jp}
N+1
p=1 ⊂ I ×I such that (iN+1, jN+1) = (i1, j1), and for
1 ≤ p ≤ N, either ip+1 = ip or jp+1 = jp, we have
N∑
p=1
χ(jp, jp+1)−
N∑
p=1
C(ip, ip+1) 6= 0.
We begin with the technical lemma.
Lemma 4 Let ~U := (U ij)(i,j)∈I×I and ~V := (V
ij)(i,j)∈I×I be a viscosity subsolution and
a viscosity supersolution to the equation (2.9), respectively. Let x ∈ Rm be fixed and
(¯i, j¯) ∈ I × I such that
V i¯j¯(x)− U i¯j¯(x) = max
i,j∈I
{V ij(x)− U ij(x)} (5.1)
and
U i¯j¯(x) ≤M i¯j¯[U ](x) or V i¯j¯(x) ≥ N i¯j¯ [V ](x). (5.2)
Then there exists (i0, j0) ∈ I × I such that
V i¯j¯(x)− U i¯j¯(x) = V i0j0(x)− U i0j0(x) (5.3)
and
U i0j0(x) > M i0j0[U ](x) and V i0j0(x) < N i0j0 [V ](x). (5.4)
Proof . Suppose that U i¯j¯(x) ≤M i¯j¯ [U ](xǫ), then there exists k 6= i¯, such that
U i¯j¯(x) ≤ Ukj¯(x)− C (¯i, k). (5.5)
Since ~V is a subsolution, it satisfies
V i¯j¯(x) ≥ V kj¯(x)− C (¯i, k) (5.6)
which implies that
U i¯j¯(x)− V i¯j¯(x) ≤ Ukj¯(x)− V kj¯(x).
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Hence
U i¯j¯(x)− V i¯j¯(x) = Ukj¯(x)− V kj¯(x). (5.7)
Then (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7) imply
U i¯j¯(x)− Ukj¯(x) = V i¯j¯(x)− V kj¯(x) = −C (¯i, k).
Similarly if V i¯j¯(x) ≥ N i¯j¯ [V ](x) hold, then there exists l 6= j¯ such that
U i¯j¯(x)− V i¯j¯(x) = U i¯l(x)− V i¯l(x)
and
U i¯j¯(x)− U i¯l(x) = V i¯j¯(x)− V i¯l(x) = χ(j¯, l).
Now if the new index (k or l) verify (5.2) , we repeat this reasoning . If this case continues
to occur, finally we find a loop (i1, j1), ..., (iN , jN), (iN+1, jN+1) = (i1, j1) such that
N∑
q=1
χ(jq, jq+1)−
N∑
q=1
C(iq, iq+1) = 0.
Hence we obtain a contradiction to the assumption (H5). Thus (5.3) and (5.4) holds for
some (i0, j0) ✷
Theorem 3 Let ~U = (U ij)(i,j)∈I×I (resp. ~V = (V
ij)(i,j)∈I×I), a family of continuous
viscosity subsolutions (resp. supersolutions) to (2.9), and satisfying a linear growth con-
dition. Then, U ij ≤ V ij for all i, j ∈ I.
P roof. Let us proceed by contradiction. For some R > 0 suppose there exists there exists
(x¯, i¯, j¯) ∈ BR × I × I (BR := {x ∈ R
m; |x| < R}) such that
max
x∈BR
max
i,j
(U ij − V ij)(x) = (U i¯j¯ − V i¯j¯)(x¯) = η > 0. (5.8)
We divide the proof into two steps.
Step 1. Using Lemma 4 we derive the existence of i0 and j0 such that
(U i0j0 − V i0j0)(x¯) = η > 0. (5.9)
and
V i0j0(x) < N i0j0[V ](x) and U i0j0(x) > M i0j0[U ](x) (5.10)
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For a small ǫ > 0, let Φǫ be the function defined as follows.
Φǫ(x, y) = U
i0j0(x)− V i0j0(y)−
1
2ǫ
|x− y|2 (x, y) ∈ Rm × Rm. (5.11)
Let (xǫ, yǫ) be such that
Φiǫjǫǫ (xǫ, yǫ) = max
x,y∈BR
max
i,j∈I
Φijǫ (x, y). (5.12)
From 2Φǫ(xǫ, yǫ) ≥ Φǫ(xǫ, xǫ) + Φ(yǫ, yǫ) we have
1
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 ≤ (U i0j0(xǫ)− U
i0j0(yǫ)) + (V
i0j0(xǫ)− V
i0j0(yǫ)), (5.13)
and consequently
1
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 is bounded, and as ǫ → 0, |xǫ − yǫ| → 0. Since U
iǫjǫ and
V iǫjǫ are uniformly continuous, then
1
2ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
Next, recalling that U i0j0 and V i0j0 are continuous, then, for ǫ small enough and at least
for a subsequence which we still index by ǫ, we obtain
V i0j0(yǫ) < N
i0j0 [V ](yǫ) and U
i0j0(xǫ) > M
i0j0[U ](xǫ) (5.14)
Step 2. Let us denote
ϕǫ(x, y) =
1
2ǫ
|x− y|2. (5.15)
Then we have: 

Dxϕǫ(x, y) =
1
ǫ
(x− y),
Dyϕǫ(x, y) = −
1
ǫ
(x− y)
B(x, y) = D2x,yϕǫ(x, y) =
1
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
.
(5.16)
Then applying the result by Crandall et al. (Theorem 3.2, [5]) to the function
U i0j0(x)− V i0j0(y)− ϕǫ(x, y)
at the point (xǫ, yǫ), for any ǫ1 > 0, we can find X, Y ∈ Sm, such that:

(1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), X
)
∈ J2,+(U i0j0(xǫ)),
(1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), Y
)
∈ J2,−(V i0j0(yǫ)),
−
( 1
ǫ1
+ ‖B(xǫ, yǫ)‖
)
I ≤
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
≤ B(xǫ, yǫ) + ǫ1B(xǫ, yǫ)
2.
(5.17)
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Then by definition of viscosity solution, we get:
rU i0j0(xǫ)− 〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ),
b(xǫ)〉 −
1
2
tr[σ∗(xǫ)Xσ(xǫ)]− f
i0j0(xǫ)] ≤ 0,
(5.18)
and
rV i0j0(yǫ)− 〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ),
b(yǫ)〉 −
1
2
tr[σ∗(yǫ)Y σ(yǫ)]− f
i0j0(yǫ) ≥ 0,
(5.19)
which implies that:
rU i0j0(xǫ)− rV
i0j0(yǫ)
≤ 〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), b(xǫ)− b(yǫ)〉+
1
2
tr[σ∗(xǫ)Xσ(xǫ)− σ
∗(yǫ)Y σ(yǫ)]
+f i0j0(xǫ)− f
i0j0(yǫ).
(5.20)
we have :
B + ǫ1B
2 ≤
ǫ+ ǫ1
ǫ2
(
I −I
−I I
)
, (5.21)
where C which hereafter may change from line to line. Choosing now ǫ1 = ǫ, yields the
relation
B + ǫ1B
2 ≤
2
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
. (5.22)
Now, from (H1), (5.17) and (5.22) we get:
1
2
tr[σ∗(xǫ)Xσ(xǫ)− σ
∗(yǫ)Y σ(yǫ)] ≤
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2.
Next
〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), b(xǫ)− b(yǫ)〉 ≤
C2
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2.
So that by plugging into (5.20) we obtain:
rU i0j0(xǫ)− rV
i0j0(yǫ)
≤
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 +
C2
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 + f i0j0(xǫ)− f
i0j0(yǫ).
(5.23)
By sending ǫ → 0, and taking into account of the continuity of f i0j0 , we obtain η ≤ 0
which is a contradiction. Thus, U ij ≤ V ij, for any (i, j) ∈ I × I, which is the desired
result. ✷
Corollary 1 The lower and upper value functions coincide, and the value function of the
stochastic differential game is given by V ij(x) := V
ij
(x) = V ij(x) for every i, j ∈ I and
x ∈ Rm. As a consequence the two equations (2.9) and (2.10) coincide.
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6 A verification theorem
In this section, we present a verification theorem which gives an optimal strategies of
our zero-sum stochastic differential game.
We suppose that a classical solution of (2.9) exists, denoted by (V ij)(i,j)∈I×I . Then
for each i, j ∈ I, V ij separates the space Rm into four regions:
C := {x ∈ Rn : V ij(x) < N ij [V ](x);V ij(x) > M ij [V ](x) and rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f ij(x) = 0}
I1 := {x ∈ R
n : V ij(x) < N ij [V ](x);V ij(x) = M ij [V ](x) and rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f ij(x) ≥ 0}
I2 := {x ∈ R
n : V ij(x) = N ij [V ](x);V ij(x) > M ij [V ](x) and rV ij(x)−AV ij(x)− f ij(x) ≤ 0}
I3 := {x ∈ R
n : V ij(x) = N ij [V ](x) and V ij(x) = M ij [V ](x)}
Let us define the strategies δ∗ := (τ ∗m, ξ
∗
m)m≥0 (resp. ν
∗ := (ρ∗n, η
∗
n)n≥0) as follows:
τ ∗0 = 0, ξ
∗
0 = i (resp. ρ
∗
0 = 0, η
∗
0 = j)
and for any m ≥ 1,


τ ∗m =


inf{s ≥ τ ∗m−1, V
ξ∗m−1bs(Xs) = maxk 6=ξ∗m−1{V
k bs(Xs)− C(ξ
∗
m−1, k)}}
+∞ if the above set is empty
and
ξ∗m =


max{k 6= ξ∗m−1, V
k aτ∗m (Xτ∗m)− C(ξ
∗
m−1, k)} if τ
∗
m < +∞
ξ∗m−1 if τ
∗
m = +∞(
resp.


ρ∗m =


inf{s ≥ ρ∗m−1, V
asη
∗
m−1(Xs) = minl 6=η∗m−1{V
asl(Xs) + χ(η
∗
m−1, l)}}
+∞ if the above set is empty
and
η∗m =


min{l 6= η∗m−1, V
aρ∗m
l(Xρ∗m) + χ(η
∗
m−1, l)} if ρ
∗
m < +∞
η∗m−1 if ρ
∗
m = +∞
)
We are now ready to present the verification theorem for our switching game.
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Theorem 4 For each i, j ∈ I, x ∈ Rm, and assume that (δ∗, ν∗) ∈ Ai × Bj. Then we
have V ij(x) = J(x, δ∗, ν∗).
P roof : First for each δ := (τm, ξm)m≥0 ∈ A
i and ν := (ρn, ηn)n≥0 ∈ B
j we define θ = (θk)
an increasing sequence of stopping times by
θ0 = τ0 = ρ0 = 0
θ1 = min(τ1, ρ1)
θ2 = min(τ11 [τ1>θ1] + τ21 [τ1≤θ1], ρ11 [ρ1>θ1] + ρ21 [ρ1≤θ1]),
θ3 = min(τ11 [τ1>θ2] + τ31 [τ1≤θ2], ρ11 [ρ1>θ2] + ρ31 [ρ1≤θ2]
, τ21 [τ2>θ2] + τ31 [τ2≤θ2], ρ21 [ρ2>θ2] + ρ31 [ρ2≤θ2]),
.....................................................
θk = min(τ11 [τ1>θk−1] + τk1 [τ1≤θk−1], ρ11 [ρ1>θk−1] + ρk1 [ρ1≤θk−1], ...
, τk−11 [τk−1>θk−1] + τk1 [τk−1≤θk−1], ρk−11 [ρk−1>θk−1] + ρk1 [ρk−1≤θk−1]).
Then the cost functional is rewritten as:
J(x, δ, ν) =
∑
k≥1
E
[ ∫ θk
θk−1
e−rsfasbs(Xs)ds−
∑
m≥1
e−rτmC(ξm−1, ξm)1 [τm=θk]
+
∑
n≥1
e−rρnχ(ηn−1, ηn)1 [ρn=θk]
]
.
(6.1)
Now, let (θ∗)k associated with δ
∗ and ν∗, then when θ∗k−1 < t < θ
∗
k we have
rV asbt(Xt)−AV
atbt(Xt) = f
atbt (6.2)
Then by Itoˆ’s formula (see, e.g., Sect. IV.45 of [31]), we obtain
E
[ ∫ θ∗
k
θ∗
k−1
e−rsfasbs(Xs)ds
]
= E
[ ∫ θ∗
k
θ∗
k−1
rV asbs(Xs)−AV
asbs(Xs)ds
]
= E
[
e−rθ
∗
k−1V
aθ∗
k−1
bθ∗
k−1 (Xθ∗
k−1
)− e−rθ
∗
kV
aθ∗
k−1
bθ∗
k−1 (Xθ∗
k
)
]
(6.3)
Substituting this into (6.1), we obtain
J(x, δ∗, ν∗) = E
[
V ij(x) +
∑
k≥1
[
{−V
aθ∗
k−1
bθ∗
k−1 (Xθ∗
k
) + V
aθ∗
k
bθ∗
k (Xθ∗
k
)
−
∑
m≥1
C(ξ∗m−1, ξ
∗
m)1 [τ∗m=θ∗k] +
∑
n≥1
χ(η∗n−1, η
∗
n)1 [ρ∗n=θ∗k]}e
−rθ∗
k
]]
.
(6.4)
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We now estimate the term in the right-hand side of (6.4) for each k ≥ 1.
• If θ∗k = τ
∗
m for some m ≥ 1 we have
V
ξ∗mbθ∗
k−1 (Xθ∗
k
)− V
ξ∗m−1bθ∗
k−1 (Xθ∗
k
)− C(ξ∗m−1, ξ
∗
m) = 0 (6.5)
• If θ∗k = ρ
∗
n for some n ≥ 1 we have
V
aθ∗
k−1
η∗n(Xθ∗
k
)− V
aθ∗
k−1
η∗n−1(Xθ∗
k
) + χ(η∗n−1, η
∗
n) = 0 (6.6)
• If θ∗k = τ
∗
m = ρ
∗
n for some m,n ≥ 1 we have
V ξ
∗
mη
∗
n(Xθ∗
k
)− V ξ
∗
m−1η
∗
n−1(Xθ∗
k
) + χ(η∗n−1, η
∗
n)− C(ξ
∗
m−1, ξ
∗
m) = 0. (6.7)
By (6.4) and the estimates in (6.5)-(6.7) it follows that
J(x, δ∗, ν∗) = V ij(x) ✷
7 Numerical results
In this section, we present the results of some numerical simulations on the game by
using MATLAB, here we apply the policy iteration algorithm for solving numerically(2.9).
In particular, for the numerical example we consider a two-regime switching problem
where the diffusion is independent of the regime and follows a geometric Brownian motion,
i.e bij(x) = bx and σij(x) = σx for some b ∈ R and σ > 0 .
We consider the following game problem:
I = {1, 2}
f 11 = 5x, f 12 = x,
f 21 = −x, f 22 = −4x,
r = 0.15, σ = 0.2, b = 0.01,
(7.1)
In the flowing figures, we plot the value functions for different switching costs.
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(a) C(1, 2) = 2, C(2, 1) = 5, χ(1, 2) = 2, χ(2, 1) = 5
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(b) C(1, 2) = 5, C(2, 1) = −1, χ(1, 2) = 2, χ(2, 1) = 2
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(c) C(1, 2) = 2, C(2, 1) = 2, χ(1, 2) = −1, χ(2, 1) = 5
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(d) C(1, 2) = 4, C(2, 1) = −2, χ(1, 2) = −1, χ(2, 1) = 3
Figure 1: Value functions:V 11(black),V 12(red),V 21(green),V 22(blue)
.
Next, we plot the optimal strategies of our zero-sum stochastic differential game. We
focus on exemple (a) in figure 1 . First let Iij→kl = {x ∈ R : V
ij(x) = V kl(x)− C(i, k) +
χ(j, l)}. Then by figure 1 (exemple (a)) we get
I11→21 = (−∞,−0.25] I11→12 = [1.46,+∞)
I12→21 = (−∞,−0.62] I12→22 = [−0.62,−0.25]
I21→11 = [0.33, 1.46] I21→12 = [1.46,+∞)
I22→21 = (−∞,−0.62] I22→12 = [0.33,+∞)
(7.2)
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Figure 2: optimal strategies and state simulation
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